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Nowadays, when faced with aging societies, family structure changes, la-
bour market transformations, non-standard employment arrangements, shad-
ow economy, financial and economic crisis, many are worried about the two 
basic issues: pension systems’ financial sustainability and benefit adequacy 
(both short-term and long-term). Therefore, almost all countries in the world 
made some changes to their pension systems. The situation is even more ag-
gravated in countries with high budget and pension system’s deficits, unfa-
vourable dependency ratios, long-term negative natural increase rates, low 
employment and high unemployment rates. Unfortunately, Croatia suffers 
from all these problems. Therefore Croatian pension system has undergone 
many reforms: one systemic reform (from 1998 to 2002 which resulted in 
the establishment of the three-pillar pension system), and several paramet-
ric reforms, the last one encompassing all three parts of the pension system 
(2013-2015). The purpose of the paper is to provide legal analyses of this 
last parametric reform in the light of sustainability and adequacy concerns 
with some inevitable reminders of the previous reform solutions. The author 
reveals many inconsistencies and lack of prudence in legislator’s approach, 
which in the long-term potentially endangers both the financial sustainability 
and benefit adequacy. Moreover, numerous and frequent legislative changes 
coupled with the existence of many groups of privileged pensioners raise fur-
ther concerns regarding predictability, stability, efficiency and fairness of the 
pension system as well as trust in the national government. Furthermore, the 
author warns that only part of the solutions lies within the pension system it-
self (through more thoughtful adjustments). Those changes should be comple-
mented by other strategies outside the pension policy (e.g. within the health 
care system, tax system and labour market regulations).
Key words: Croatia, pensions, pension reform, sustainability, adequacy.
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INTRODUCTION1
Since the late 20th century, predomi-
nantly due to population aging, economic 
turmoil, changes in the labour market and 
thereto related changes in the employment 
leading to more atypical jobs and non-
standard employment careers, the adequacy 
and sustainability concerns gained promi-
nence among a wide circle of scholars and 
collective actors (such as the European 
Commission, World Bank). The existing 
organization of public and private pension 
schemes has been compromised and major 
reforms began, transferring more respon-
sibility from the state and employers to 
individuals (Vukorepa, 2012: 350). In the 
period from the 90’s to date, many reports 
show that almost all of the EU; OECD, 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South 
Africa) as well as other countries have un-
dertaken some type of reform within their 
public and private pension schemes (e.g. 
World Bank, 1994, 2000; European Un-
ion, 2003; OECD, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013; 
ISSA, 2013). 
The reforms differ in terms of their ex-
tent, from parametric changes within the ex-
isting pension systems to more comprehen-
sive, systemic reforms. In order to promote 
general economic liberalization, the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
supported systemic reforms of the defined 
benefit pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) systems, 
directing them towards privatization and 
the establishment of a multi-pillar system 
(public-private mix) with defined contribu-
tion funded parts (World Bank, 1994, 2000; 
Barr and Rutkowski, 2005). This type of 
 
reform has been advocated mostly in Latin 
America and Central and South-eastern 
Europe, where due to the long presence of 
the socialist regime, private pensions have 
not been developed, unlike in other coun-
tries of the West. Furthermore, primarily 
due to demographic changes (increased 
life expectancy, improvements in mortal-
ity and low fertility rates), many countries 
have also been undertaking parametric re-
forms. These predominantly relate to link-
ing pensions to changes in life expectancy 
by increasing retirement age and providing 
incentives to work longer. Other paramet-
ric reforms are aimed at long-term reduc-
tion in public pension spending through 
sustainability factors introduced into ben-
efit calculation (e.g. early retirement decre-
ments, changes in pension valorisation and 
indexation). There are also measures aimed 
at better pension adequacy (e.g. through in-
creases in minimum pensions or social pen-
sions, or by supporting supplementary pen-
sion systems by various tax advantages), 
(Vukorepa, 2012: 94-161). 
Another round of reforms has been 
more recently caused by 2008 financial and 
economic crisis. The concerns about fiscal 
deficits and macroeconomic imbalances, 
prevailing currently in the EU,2 resulting 
often in strict austerity agenda, brought 
new or more accelerated changes, mainly 
sustainability and financial-affordability 
oriented. It has been reported that some 
countries increased taxes on pension in-
come or contributions to public defined 
benefit schemes. Widely used methods to 
mitigate spending are: 1) reduction of ben-
efits (while maintaining or improving the 
1  This paper is partially result of a research done within the research project »New Croatian legal system« really 
financed by the Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb (2014).
2 For more see: Europe 2020 strategy, Stability and Growth Pact and its »preventive arm mechanism« through 
stability and convergence programs and »corrective arm mechanism« in the form of Excessive Deficit Procedure; in 
addition there is also a Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, that is a surveillance mechanism for the identification 
of potential risks early on, trying to prevent the emergence of harmful macroeconomic imbalances and correct the 
imbalances that are already in place.  
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retirement‑income adequacy for vulner-
able groups), 2) more unfavourable indexa-
tion formulas and deferrals or moratoria to 
indexation, 3) more accelerated increases 
in the statutory retirement age (thereby try-
ing to enlarge the contribution base while 
preserving adequacy for those effectively 
working longer), and 4) work incentives 
through tighter access to early‑retirement 
and increased financial incentives to work, 
(OECD, 2014: 54-69; Hinrichs, 2015). The 
post-2008 pension reforms are perceived 
as »rapid policy changes«, that would not 
have been politically feasible otherwise 
(Hinrichs, 2015). In some Central and East 
European Countries, the multi-pillar path 
that had been entered before, was reconsid-
ered or even completely abandoned. These 
were immediate measures directed towards 
the reduction of PAYG schemes deficit and 
reduction of public debt, thereby shifting 
obligations at the later stage which all in-
crease the so called »implicit debt«, i.e. the 
present value of future pension promises 
(e.g. Hinrichs, 2015: 20; OECD, 2012: 77-
98). Moreover, it has been predicted that 
the consequences of such pension reversals 
will be borne by individuals in the form of 
lower benefits in retirement (OECD, 2012: 
95-96). Since 2012, some countries have 
increased mandatory contributions to fund-
ed defined contribution schemes (OECD, 
2014: 54). The problem with this measure 
is that it might increase the so called »tran-
sition cost« if done at the expense of de-
fined benefit mandatory schemes (Vukore-
pa, 2012: 155). Therefore, in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis, policies to increase 
pension adequacy from funded parts are 
especially important. Quite common were 
measures to improve diversification and 
security of investment, governance of pen-
sion funds, as well as changes to curb pen-
sion administration costs (OECD, 2014: 
54, 63).
Croatia has also undertaken many re-
forms in the last two decades: one systemic 
reform (from 1998 to 2002 which resulted 
in the establishment of the three-pillar pen-
sion system), and several parametric re-
forms, the last one encompassing all three 
parts of the pension system (2013-2015). 
The system has been torn apart between 
sustainability and adequacy issues, while 
its stability and the trust in the national 
government has been jeopardized by nu-
merous changes, especially regarding the 
1st pillar (PAYGO, underfunded, defined 
benefit pension scheme). From 1998 to 
2013, it was amended 18 times, and from 
2013 to 2015, three times already. Other 
two, mandatory and voluntary funded de-
fined contribution schemes have also un-
dergone some changes. 
The aim of this paper is to provide le-
gal analyses of the main reform trends in 
the light of sustainability and adequacy 
issues and reveal the inconsistency in the 
legislator’s approach. The focus will be on 
the 2013-2015 reform regarding mandatory 
part of the Croatian pension system, how-
ever with some inevitable reminders on 
past reform solutions. The rest of the paper 
is organized as follows: the next chapter 
gives a short overview of some theoreti-
cal considerations. The third chapter pro-
vides a general description of the current 
Croatian three-pillar pension system and 
its main features as to give the reader a bet-
ter understanding of the reform context. 
The fourth chapter addresses the issue of 
reform trends into more detail. The reform 
measures (e.g. increase of retirement age, 
benefit formula changes, new types of 
early exits, indexation etc.) are clustered 
and analysed from the sustainability and 
adequacy perspective. The author points 
to the inconsistency in the approach and 
specifies many countermeasures within 
the pension system and outside. The final 
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chapter presents main concluding remarks 
and indicates pathways to adequacy and 
sustainability concerns, not just within the 
pension system itself, but on a much wider 
scale (e.g. within the health care system, 
tax system and labour market regulations) 
requiring thus fine tuning and more coor-




The pension system is a very important 
part of every country’s social security sys-
tem because it is supposed to prevent old-
age poverty and replace life time earnings. 
It can be organized in various ways regard-
ing different elements such as the type of 
providers, coverage, financing, benefit’s 
purpose, benefit’s formulas, redistribu-
tion levels, risk sensitivity, etc. (Vukorepa, 
2012: 165-186). However, every pension 
system, be it mono-pillar or multi-pillar, 
comes down to the fundamental ques-
tion: how much are economically active 
persons willing to pay for their needs 
and the needs of others at present and 
in the future. Solving this problem is com-
plex and involves a number of factors that 
should be taken into account, both at the 
individual and collective level. The indi-
vidual perspective changes with aging. 
While transiting from being an insured per-
son to becoming a pensioner, we are more 
and more concerned about the adequacy of 
our future pensions. At the collective level, 
pension system regulation depends on de-
mographic, economic, social and political 
determinants of the society, and sometimes 
even has a negative impact on some of them. 
Furthermore, there is a collision between 
the logic of long-term liabilities and the 
logic of changing policies, which is typi-
cal for parliamentary democracies. On the 
one hand, the time dimension requires sus-
tainability and continuity; however, the po-
litical dimension very often contradicts it, 
because it is subject to variable social pres-
sure and political pacts: namely, pensioners 
and those close to the retirement age are the 
largest group of voters.  
Most  problems in the pension world 
are believed to be connected to the chang-
es in the population structure, specifically 
age structure, that has major impact on the 
economy, labour force and social welfare 
system, hence also on the pension systems. 
Population structure is affected by demo-
graphic changes in fertility, mortality and 
migration, each of them having different 
time impact (Murphy, 2011). Hence, it is 
widely accepted that several demographic 
trends have affected spending in the pen-
sion systems, especially in PAYGO, such 
as: decline in fertility, mortality improve-
ments and increased life expectancy, weak-
ening of family ties, and increase of female 
labour force participation (Profeta, 2011). 
Some scholars see public pension sys-
tems, children and financial markets as 
different instruments to insure old-age 
income (e.g. Cigno, 2011:111-112; Profeta, 
2011: 26). Therefore, it has been suggested 
that those three should be analysed togeth-
er. Further, it is argued that the size of the 
pension system has a negative effect on fer-
tility, as well as the development of capital 
markets. Thus public pension systems that 
are under-funded are also financially unsus-
tainable because they tend to erode the tax 
and contribution base on which they rest 
(Cigno, 2011: 113). In relation to that, it is 
suggested that when saving is more costly, 
individuals rely more on fertility, therefore 
one could interestingly predict a potential 
role of recuperation in fertility in the coun-
tries where pension reforms have decreased 
their generosity (Profeta, 2011:25).
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Further on, as already indicated above, 
apart from the changes in the population 
structure, other important transformations 
have affected pension systems, such as 
slower economic growth, labour market 
transformations and thereto-related chang-
es in the employment leading to more jobs 
that are atypical and non-standard employ-
ment careers. Hence, the problems of 
pension adequacy (referring both to the 
absolute level of preventing old age pov-
erty and to the relative level of replacing 
life – time earnings) and sustainability of 
pension systems (referring to its financial 
soundness) gained prominence among a 
wide circle of scholars and collective ac-
tors, such as the European Commission, 
World Bank and OECD. In addition to ad-
equacy and sustainability, the World Bank 
applies other two important criteria for 
evaluating public pension systems, namely 
the affordability referring to the financ-
ing capacity of individuals and society, and 
robustness referring to the capacity of the 
pension system to withstand major shocks 
in order to sustain income replacement tar-
gets over long term (Holzmann and Hinz, 
2005: 55-57). In addition, the safety crite-
ria should also be emphasized, especially 
in relation to funded parts of the multi-
pillar pension systems (e.g. the European 
Commission, 2012). Furthermore, since all 
types of pension systems are actually long-
term obligations, one should not neglect 
the importance of retaining/ regaining the 
confidence in the pension systems through 
its fairness, stability and predictability 
(Vukorepa, 2012: 191-209). Coming back 
to the sustainability and adequacy concerns 
and the theoretical prism through which we 
will primarily observe the Croatian pension 
system, they both depend on the degree to 
which they are underpinned by contribu-
tions, taxes and savings from people in em-
ployment. Therefore, the European Com-
mission (2012: 3-4) warns EU Member 
States that financing arrangements, eligi-
bility conditions and labour market condi-
tions must be calibrated in such a way that 
a balanced relation between contributions 
and entitlements, and between the number 
of employed contributors and the number 
of retired beneficiaries, can be achieved. 
Regarding entitlements, another poten-
tial problem within the pension system may 
represent the benefit formula and the extent 
to which individual benefits match individ-
ual contributions. Thus we can differentiate 
between: 1) persons receiving actuarially 
fair benefits, 2) persons receiving implicit 
pension subsidy, when capitalized value 
of their contributions is lower than the ex-
pected value of the pension benefits), 3) 
person paying implicit pension tax, when 
capitalized value of contributions is higher 
than the expected value of the pension ben-
efits (Cigno, 2011: 108-109). Therefore, if 
the benefit formula is redistributive, some 
will enjoy an implicit pension subsidy, and 
others suffer an implicit pension tax, irre-
spective of the pension fund’s assets – li-
abilities ratio (Cigno, 2011:109). If the sys-
tem is underfunded, and if the redistribu-
tions level of the systems stays at the same 
level, transfers from the state budgets will 
be necessary, potentially increasing fiscal 
deficits. Thus, the question of redistribu-
tion involves a dilemma how to share 
the financing burden more fairly across 
generations and between the same gen-
erations. Switching partially to funding 
makes pension systems financially more 
sustainable and actuarially fair (because 
everybody pays for their own pension), 
but not necessarily with an adequate level 
of pension benefits due to e.g. the problem 
of low wage earners, career breaks, invest-
ment risks, longevity risk (Vukorepa, 2012: 
179-186). 
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The question of pension adequacy is a 
difficult one. Firstly, there is a question of 
how much is enough. The answer depends 
on the objectives, i.e. income replacement 
and/or poverty reduction, thereby bearing 
in mind that different parts of the pension 
system might have different objectives. 
One should also take into account other 
factors within the society (e.g. housing and 
utilities costs, structure of ownership of 
dwellings, free or cheaper public services 
for the elderly in the public sector, espe-
cially health care and public transportation, 
trends in savings, preferential taxation re-
gimes) which may all increase the actual 
level of income in the old age. Secondly, 
there is a question of how to measure the 
adequacy of pension benefits: in relation 
to individual earnings (prior to retirement, 
or average earnings), economy wide aver-
age earnings, necessary household costs 
etc. There are several forms of individual 
and aggregate measurements.3 However, 
since I will not empirically test the adequa-
cy of the Croatian pension system, I find 
it not necessary to elaborate more on those 
various measurements. 
The problem of sustainability of pub-
lic pension systems could be solved in sev-
eral ways, although not all the solutions are 
likely to be considered as acceptable within 
a certain country. Firstly, by higher contri-
butions or taxes, which might lead to in-
creases in production costs, thus impairing 
the competitiveness and lowering the net 
wages. Secondly, by lower pensions, that 
adversely affects the benefit’s adequacy. 
Thirdly, by measures aimed at achieving a 
more favourable pension system’s sup-
port ratio (contributor/pensioner’s ratio). 
It is well known that the third option can 
be brought about in several ways: 1) in-
creases in employment rate, 2) reduction of 
the number of unemployed, 3) earlier en-
try into the labour market (which is doubt-
ful taking into account longer duration of 
education nowadays), 4) increased par-
ticipation of women in the labour market 
(which requires establishment and proper 
functioning of other social institutions for 
taking care of children and other frail rela-
tives), and 5) prolongation of working lives 
by increasing retirement age. In order for 
people  to be really able and stimulated to 
work longer, what matters is how the pen-
sion system affects their individual behav-
iour, and this does not depend on a single 
feature of a system (e.g. statutory retire-
ment age), but on its overall architecture 
(Cigno, 2011). Hence reforms within and 
outside of the pension system are needed. 
Among measures within the pension 
system, the widely recognized ones are: 
1) abolition or reduction of special early 
retirement schemes, 2) lifting of the earli-
est retirement age, 3) closer contribution – 
benefit link that will reduce the so called 
»implicit tax« on longer working lives, 4) 
actuarially fair deductions for early exits 
and increases for late exits, 5) tightening 
access to disability pension. Nevertheless, 
when taking these measures one has to be 
cautious, because changes in the sphere 
of family, labour market and welfare state 
3  Forms of individual adequacy measurements are e.g. replacement rate in the form of individual net pension 
entitlement divided by average life-time earnings or individual net pension entitlement divided by net pre-retirement 
earnings; relative pension level as individual pension level divided by economy-wide average  earnings, theoretical 
replacement rate for hypothetical with certain characteristic regarding wage and career length, etc. There are also 
many forms of aggregate measurements such as  median relative income of elderly people (income situation of those 
aged 65 and more relative to the younger age group 64 and less), aggregate replacement ratio (as median individual 
gross pension relative to the median individual gross earnings) etc. For more see: European Commission, 2012; 
Vukorepa, 2012: 191-202; Nestić i Tomić, 2012: 63-67. 
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restructuring (due to technological chang-
es, globalisation, de-standardisation of 
employment, demographic aging, single 
parenthood) resulted in the emergence of 
»new social risks« (such as low or obso-
lete skills, atypical jobs, insufficient cov-
erage through social protection schemes), 
consequently leading to the problems of 
the working poor, enforced early exits and 
pockets of poverty (Hinrichs and Jessoula, 
2012: 5-6). In these cases, strengthening of 
the redistributive measures (means tested 
or more universalistic) could be crucial for 
effective economic security in the old age. 
Moreover, it is rightfully argued that 
more than retirement policy is needed to 
make higher retirement age a viable cop-
ing strategy. Complementary measures 
outside the pension system need to be de-
veloped, such as: 1) high overall employ-
ment level that improves the labour market 
absorbing capacity for older workers, 2) 
measures towards actual employability of 
older workers, 3) measures preventing and/
or overcoming age related declines in the 
ability to work depending on occupation-
al differences, 4) jobs that are tailored to 
the functional capacities of the individual 
worker, 5) employee recruitment and dis-
missal strategies, 6) family policies and ed-
ucational policies including training oppor-
tunities for older workers (Hinrichs, 2011 ). 
Consequently, by taking into account 
all these various theoretical considerations, 
it is obvious that the success of reform 
measures depends on the overall architec-
ture of the pension system, as well as on 
other economic and social determinates 
within societies.
MAIN FEATURES OF THE 
CROATIAN PENSION SYSTEM 
Before 1998 the Croatian system used 
to be one-pillar PAYGO defined benefit 
(DB) system with roots in Bismarckian 
social insurance model, characterised by a 
very low retirement age, for old age 60 for 
men and 55 for women, and for early retire-
ment 55 for men and 50 for women (Puljiz, 
2007; Baloković, 2011: 109-110). Due to 
the problems of transitional economy and 
wartime sufferings, a large number of so-
cially vulnerable persons (especially the 
unemployed and the disabled) tried to find 
their security within the pension system. 
This created an unsustainable financial 
pressures and the need for change. Thus, in 
1998 the first significant parametric reform 
was implemented, focused on rationaliza-
tion and control of pension costs. It includ-
ed the gradual raising of the retirement age 
(during 10 year period, 6 month per calen-
dar year), establishment of restrictive dis-
ability criteria, changes in the pension for-
mula and modifications in indexation rules 
from wage indexation to combined indexa-
tion: 50% wage: 50% prices (Potočnjak, 
1999, 2000a, 2000b). The Pension Insur-
ance Act of 1998 also laid the foundation 
of the systemic reform, which continued in 
1999 and was implemented in 2002, when 
a mixed three pillar pension system became 
operational consisting of PAYGO defined 
benefit and funded defined contribution 
schemes. 
As already indicated in the introducto-
ry part, since 1998 the legislative frame-
work has been amended and changed on 
too many occasions. Currently it consists 
of many laws and by-laws.4 The first pil-
4  At the end of 2013, the new parametric reform has been undertaken. It came into effect at the beginning 
of 2014 when four new laws regulating three pillar pension system entered into force: 1) Pension Insurance Act 
(NN 157/2013, 151/2014, 33/2015), 2) Act on Compulsory Pension Funds, NN 19/2014), 3) Act on Voluntary 
Pension Funds (NN 19/2014), and 4) Act on Pension Insurance Companies (NN 22/2014). Apart from Pension 
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lar is a PAYGO defined benefits (points 
system) scheme. It is financed by contri-
butions and the deficit is financed by the 
State Budget, hence indirectly by taxes and 
other Government transfers (in 2014 the 
deficit was HRK 13.984 billion).5 Other 
two pillars are fully funded defined con-
tribution schemes based on individual 
accounts (financed by contributions and 
investment returns). The second pillar is 
mandatory, while the third pillar is a vol-
untary supplementary scheme. Within the 
third pillar, two types of voluntary pension 
funds can be established: 1) »open-ended 
pension funds« (open to all citizens), 2) 
»closed–ended pension funds« (sponsored 
by employers, trade unions or other pro-
fessional associations, hence participation 
is only allowed to employees or members 
respectively). There are no occupationally 
defined benefit schemes.6 Within the man-
datory second pillar, participants can save 
only within one mandatory pension fund 
on their individual account, but within the 
voluntary third pillar, saving in more pen-
sion funds is allowed.7 Regarding admin-
istration and supervision of the pension 
system, there are several public and private 
stakeholders depending on the type of the 
scheme.8  
Regarding coverage, the first pillar 
is a very broad one. Compulsory insured 
are all economically active persons, but 
also some others (e.g. volunteers and ap-
prentices, farmers, as well as a parent of a 
small child up to 1 year or care-needy child 
Insurance Act there are also other important laws regulating first PAYGO scheme. These are: 1) Maximum Pension 
Act (NN 162/1998, 82/2001), 2) Act on Pension Supplement for Pensions Earned under the Pension Insurance Act 
(NN 79/2007, 114/2011); 3) Act on the Insurance Periods Counted with Extended Duration (NN 71/1999, 46/2007, 
41/2008, 61/2011). Other laws (all together 18 of them), relate to contribution payment, taxation, and regulation of 
more favourable pension conditions for 14 special groups of insured persons.
5  Calculated on the basis of the data on revenues from pension contributions (HRK 22.493 billion) and 
expenditures for pension benefits (HRK 36.477 billion), Amendments of the State Budget for 2014 (NN 141/14). 
6  However, since accession to the EU (pursuant to Art. 30 of the Amendments to the Act on Compulsory and 
Voluntary Pension Funds, NN 124/10) voluntary pension funds established in Croatia may manage occupational 
defined benefits pension plans in other EU Member States. It is important to note that the new Act on Voluntary 
Pension Funds (NN 19/2014) prescribes in Art. 266. the following: » (1) A pension company may establish and 
manage a defined benefits closed-ended pension fund for the sponsoring employer of other Member States, if the 
establishment of such types of pension funds is permitted by the law of that Member State. (2) In the Croatian 
territory a closed-end defined benefits retirement plans cannot be offered«.
7  Act on Compulsory Pension Funds, NN 19/2014, Arts. 90, para. 3; Act on Voluntary Pension Funds, NN 
19/2014, Art. 114, para. 2.
8  The general competent authority is the Ministry of Labour and Pension System that is in charge for legislative 
proposals and general supervision of the functioning and implementation of all parts of the pension system. The 
Croatian Pension Insurance Institute (HZMO) administers the PAYGO pillar. For the operation of the second 
pillar important is Central Registry of Affiliates (REGOS), because it keeps record of the personal accounts and is 
responsible for the transfer of paid contributions to the chosen mandatory pension fund.  Pension companies operate 
the funded part of the system in the accumulation phase. Regarding organization of pension companies and their 
permissibility to manage pension funds, in 2014 Croatia transferred from the model of exclusive management 
(meaning one mandatory pension company for managing one mandatory pension fund), to the non-exclusive model 
(now can one pension companies manage both mandatory and voluntary pension funds).  The second pillar pensions 
can still be paid only by the pension insurance companies, but since 2014 pensions from the voluntary third pillar 
can be also paid by other legal entities (such as pension companies and UCITS investment fund companies), 
provided they have obtained special authorisation (Act on Pension Insurance Companies, NN 22/14, Art. 9). Croatian 
Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA) supervises business operations and carries procedure of granting 
authorizations for pension companies and pension insurance companies.
287
Rev. soc. polit., god. 22, br. 3, str. 279-308, Zagreb 2015. Vukorepa I.: Lost between Sustainability and Adequacy...
if not covered on the bases of economically 
active status).9 Persons insured under the 
first pillar are normally also insured un-
der the second pillar. However, regarding 
participation right in a multi-pillar system 
there are three situations that should be dif-
ferentiated: 1) all persons under the age of 
40 (either at the time of the reform or at 
the time of becoming an insuree) have to 
participate within the two-tier mandatory 
system double coverage; 2) persons aged 
between 40 and 50 at the time of the reform 
could choose between staying  within the 
PAYGO scheme only or joining the new 
two-tier mandatory system with the second 
pillar funded part,10 and 3) persons over 50 
had to remain  within the first pillar only. 
The third pillar is open to all persons, re-
gardless of their age and employment sta-
tus.11 
For many years, the PAYGO scheme 
has been suffering from a very high de-
pendency ratio, now amounting to 87.57 
percent, with only around 1.39 million con-
tributors (»insurees«), and 1.22 pensioners 
(more detailed historic data in Table 1).
9  Pension Insurance Act, NN 157/2013, 151/2014, 33/2015, Arts. 9-21; Social Assistance Act, NN 157/13, 
152/2014), Art 67 (for parent-caregiver)
10  The choice of the system was permanent for persons between the age of 40 and 50 and could not be changed 
until legislative amendments in 2011. These amendments allowed for the opt-out from the second pillar scheme 
during the pension take-up period, if the pension from the first pillar would be more favourable than the one from 
the two-tier system.
11  Old legislation: Act on Mandatory and Voluntary Pension Funds (NN 49/1999, 63/2000, 103/2003, 177/2004, 
140/2005, 71/2007, 124/2010, 114/2011, 51A/2013, 19/2014, Art. 40 and 105); new legislative basis: Act on 
Compulsory Pension Funds, NN 19/2014, Arts. 90, 104; Act on Voluntary Pension Funds, NN 19/2014, Art. 3, 114-
120. 
Table 1 
System dependency indicators of 1st pillar pension scheme
Year (end of the 
period) Contributors Pensioners Dependency ratio, % Support ratio
1950 593,102 67,771 11,43 8.75
1960 912,290 176,978 19,40 5.15
1970 1,166,088 340,134 29.17 3.43
1980 1,518,049 438,133 28.86 3.46
1990 1,682,971 594,339 35.31 2.83
2000 1,380,510 1,018,504 73.78 1.36
2010 1,475,363 1,200,386 81.36 1.23
2011 1,468,133 1,213,121 82.63 1.21
2012 1,432,740 1,217,692 84.99 1.18
2013 1,400,631 1,190,815 85.02 1.18
2014 1,397,400 1,223,738 87.57 1.14
Source: Croatian Pension Insurance Institute. 
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The number of individual accounts 
within the second pillar is higher that the 
number of contributors in the first pillar (at 
the end of 2014 it was 1,702,218), which 
can be explained by the fact that employed 
persons when becoming unemployed con-
tinue keeping individual retirement ac-
counts as inactive until new employment 
or self-employment. Despite some State 
financed incentives, the number of persons 
saving within the voluntary third pillar is 
slowly increasing (see Table 2). 
Table 2 
Membership in various types of pension funds – 2nd and 3rd pillar
Type of Pension Fund 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Pillar II Mandatory 1,561,454 1,604,336 1,652,802 1,702,218 1,705,720
Pillar III Open Voluntary 169,841 184,100 190,994 204,546 220,507
Pillar III Closed Voluntary 17,613 18,153 23,146 22,685 23,924
Source: Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency.
Total contribution rate for mandatory 
pension insurance is 20 percent. Persons 
covered only by PAYGO scheme pay all 
contributions only to the first pillar, while 
persons insured under both pillars pay 15 
percent to the first pillar and 5 percent to the 
second pillar. For persons employed in haz-
ardous and physically strenuous jobs, there 
are additional contributions. These em-
ployees have the right to extended period of 
insurance and lower retirement age.12 The 
contribution is paid from employee wages 
or from the »pension insurance base« (for 
self-employed persons and some other cat-
egories). The minimum monthly contribu-
tion base is 35 percent and the maximum is 
600 percent of the average salary,13 howev-
er the regular maximum pension is capped 
at 380 percent of the average earnings (thus 
some of those persons can be considered as 
paying implicit pension tax14). 
Regarding tax policy, tax-exempt are 
contributions paid for mandatory pension 
schemes. Since 2010, it has partially also 
applied to the third pillar pensions. Name-
ly, employers matching contributions to 
the voluntary individual account are not 
subject to income tax up to HRK 500.00 
per month or the total of HRK 6,000.00 
per year. Furthermore, in order to encour-
age savings within the third pillar, the state 
is subsidizing voluntary contributions by 
15% of the amount of the contributions 
actually paid (incentive can be awarded 
12  Contributions Act, NN 84/2008, 152/2008, 94/2009, 18/2011, 22/2012, 144/2012, 148/2013, 41/2014, 
143/2014, Art. 13; Act on the Insurance Periods Counted with Extended Duration, NN 71/1999, 46/2007, 41/2008, 
61/2011.  
13  For the purpose of counting of the minimum and maximum contribution bases national average salary is 
counted for the first 8 months of the previous year (Contributions Act, Art. 7, para 1., point 39) .
14  Some of the persons with contribution base ranging from 380 to 600 percent of the average wage will not 
pay an implicit pension tax, because the maximum pension is calculated on the basis of average value points during 
entire insurance period (showing the ratio between gross or net average person’s earnings compared and the average 
national earnings). Average value points are capped at 3.8 (hence 380% of average earnings). Since only a few person 
have such high incomes (hence also contribution base) thought-out their insurance period, only those whose pension 
amount is actually limited by maximum pension can be considered paying implicit pension tax. They amount to 
approximately 0.3% of all the pensioners (Croatian Pension Insurances Institute, Statistical Information).
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(the first and second pillar) is based on two 
distinct financial channels, unfunded (PAY-
GO) defined benefit scheme and funded 
defined contribution scheme. Hence, the 
pension benefits are also calculated differ-
ently.  The first pillar pension depends on 
several elements: years of insurance, wages 
(contribution base) compared to average 
wage, age of retirement, pension type, pen-
sion valorisation and indexation, and since 
2014 on the average contribution rate for 
the first pillar pension compared to the to-
tal contribution rate for mandatory pension 
insurance.17 The legislative framework also 
provides for the minimum pension (with-
out means testing) and maximum pen-
sion.18 Contrary to such defined personal 
points system, pensions from funded part 
for contributions in the maximum amount 
of HRK 5,000.00 per year; so the maxi-
mum incentive amounts to HRK 750.00 
annually).15 Pensions in payment from the 
mandatory schemes are taxed; however, 
under preferential regime because there is 
a higher non-taxable portion of the income 
(so called “basic personal allowance”) for 
pensioners than for wage earners and the 
self-employed (more details in the next 
chapter). The third pillar pensions in pay-
ment are normally tax-exempted; only the 
third pillar pensions are partially taxed pro-
portionally to the tax relief awarded during 
accumulation phase when contributions 
were paid.16  
The payment of pension benefits for 
persons participating in two-tier system 
15  Before 2010, incentives for savings within the third pillar were higher, up to 25 percent of paid contribution 
of maximum HRK 5,000, hence maximum incentive amounted to HRK 1,250.00 per annum (Vukorepa, 2011: 100-
101). 
16  Income Tax Act of 2004 with latest amendments from 2014 (NN177/2004, 73/2008, 80/2010, 114/2011, 
22/2012, 144/2012, 43/2013, 120/2013, 125/2013, 148/2013, 83/2014, 143/2014), Arts. 9, 10, 31 and 36.
17  All these elements are reflected in the pension formula that is a product of personal points, pension factor, 
actual pension value and the average ratio of contributions paid to the first pillar scheme in relation to the total 
mandatory pension contribution rate. Personal points are calculated in the manner that the average value points are 
multiplied with the insurance period (qualifying periods) and the initial factor. Value points per year of insurance 
are the result of the division of gross or net earnings per calendar year per gross or net average annual wage. A value 
point has a value of 1 if the insuree had annual salary equal to the average salary of all employed persons in the same 
calendar year. Initial factor is used for the calculation of pension benefits in the case of early retirement or retirement 
after the old-age retirement age. Hence, it can either reduce the pension per each calendar month of early retirement, 
or increase pension benefit for each calendar month of postponed retirement. From 2014 maximum reduction for 5 
years of early retirement ranges from 6% to 20.4%, depending on the years of insurance, while maximum increase 
for later retirement is 9%. Pension factor depends on the pension type and determines to what extent personal points 
will be taken into account. It is never higher than 1. For old age and early retirement pension, it is 1. For survivor’s 
pension it depends on the number of family members; for disability pensions it depends on the type of disability 
(total disability or partial disability), risk occurrences (accident at work or occupational disease), and the fact weather 
disabled person is working or is unemployed. Actual pension value is the value of one personal point; hence, the 
amount is used for valorisation and indexation of pensions. The basic pension factor has been introduced in 2014 
and reflects the average ratio of contributions paid to the PAYGO scheme (the 1st pillar) in relation to the total 
contribution rate for the two tier mandatory system. Persons participating only within the first pillar have also right 
to pension supplement. The amount of supplement depends on the year of retirement (from 2010 onwards it is 27%). 
Some groups of pensioners are not entitled to that supplement such as: two-tier pensioners as well as pensioners 
receiving minimum pension, maximum pension and “privileged” pension.  More on benefit formulas see: Potočnjak, 
2000b; Pension Insurance Act of 2014, Art. 79-93, Act on Pension Supplement, NN 79/2007, 114/2011.
18  At the end of 2014, there were 205,321 pensioners receiving minimum pension and only 1,614 persons 
receiving regular maximum pension (Croatian Pension Insurance Institute, Statistical Information, 4/2014:  33). The 
minimum pension is not set as absolute amount. It depends on the number of qualifying years multiplied by the 
minimum actual pension value, currently amounting to HRK 59.05 HRK. When compared to regular actual pension 
value set at 60.92 HRK, it is obvious that it is set very high, at 97% of the actual pension value, resulting in significant 
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culated for minimum 40 years of insurance 
period, hence in most cases regardless of 
the actual years of insurance). Benefits in 
terms of pensions under the mandatory 
schemes comprise old-age pension (includ-
ing early retirement pension), survivors’ 
pension and disability pension. 
Further on, it should be mentioned 
that within the mandatory part of the pen-
sion system there is no separate scheme 
for special categories or occupations, but 
there have been special laws under the 
general system which afford more favour-
able pension conditions to 14 categories 
of the so-called »privileged pensioners« 
(Bađun, 2009).19 Some changes have been 
adopted in the meantime, such as pension 
reduction, different indexation rule, aboli-
tion of privileged retirement conditions for 
some high state officials (e.g. for members 
of the Parliament, Government, judges of 
the Constitutional Court and General Audit 
were abolished with effect from 3 Febru-
ary 2012, thus only for new pensioners).20 
Nevertheless they represent a long-term 
and growing financial burden to the under-
funded first-pillar: at the end of 2011 they 
(the second and third pillar) depend on the 
total amount of contributions paid, invest-
ment returns, administration costs, life-ex-
pectancy at the time of retirement (unisex 
tables since 2014) and type of annuity (Vu-
korepa, 2012: 238-239).  
The entitlement to the second pillar pen-
sion is conditioned upon entitlement to the 
first pillar pension, while pensions within 
the third pillar can be paid out already at 
the age of 50, which is much lower than the 
statutory retirement old-age (currently 65 
for men and there is equalisation transition-
al period for women). More on retirement 
age changes will be explained in the next 
section. Pensioners within the framework 
of mandatory system receive their pensions 
only on a lifelong basis, while from the vol-
untary system they can receive them either 
on a lifelong or on a temporary basis (par-
tial one-time withdrawal of max. 30 percent 
is also permitted). The mandatory schemes 
cover the traditional risks of old-age, death, 
disability, physical injury, including also 
higher rights if the risks of death and dis-
ability were caused by accidents at work 
and occupational diseases (pension is cal-
degree of redistribution (Pension Insurance Act of 2014, Art. Art. 90). However, this degree of redistribution is partially 
reduced by the “pension supplement” (amounting to 27% for single tier pensioners that retired in 2010 and onwards). 
Hence, all those persons whose average wages or contribution bases were below 76.325% compared to the average 
national wage will be entitled to minimum pension. Regular maximum pension is capped at 380 percent of persons 
earnings compared to economy wide average earnings, while the contributions can be paid up to the 600 percent of the 
average earnings. However, for some privileged pension groups it can be higher (e.g. war veterans, but also used to be 
higher for MP’s, Constitutional Court judges etc.), see: Maximum Pension Act, NN, 162/1998, 82/2001.
19  These 14 different groups of privileged pensioner have been the following: Members of the Croatian Home 
Guard Army (1941-1945); National Liberation War participants (from 1943-1945); Employees performing certain 
activities within the Internal Affairs and Justice; Former political prisoners; Members of the former Yugoslav National 
Army; Full members of the Croatian Academy of Science and Arts; Members of the Parliamentary Executive 
Council, Federal Executive Council and administratively retired public servants in the former SFRY; Members of the 
Croatian Parliament, members of the Government, Constitutional Court judges and the Auditor General; Miners from 
the Istrian coal mines »Tupljak«, d.d. Labin; Workers professionally exposed to asbestos; Members of the Croatian 
Army, Police Officers, Authorised Officials; Croatian homeland war veterans (1990-1996); Members of the Croatian 
Defence Council (CDC).
20  For members of the Parliament, Government, judges of the Constitutional Court and General Audit privileged 
retirement conditions were abolished with effect from 3 February 2012, thus only for new pensioners  (Amendments 
to the Act on Rights and Duties of Croatian Parliament Representatives, NN 12/2012). However, Constitutional 
Court’s decision (U-I-4113/2008, 12 August 2014) restored the right to retire according to the regulations in force at 
the time they were holding the office, regardless of the time of applying for the right to parliamentary pension. Hence, 
pension expenditures will not be decreased as originally expected.  
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amounted to 14.18 percent and in 2014 to 
14.88 percent of all the benefi ciaries (Croa-
tian Pension Insurance Institute, Statistical 
information, 4/2011: 11, 30, 4/2014: 12, 
34). If we add to those 14 privileged groups 
other pensioners that also receive »implicit 
pension subsidy« (in the form of minimum 
pension, survivor’s pension, disability pen-
sion and early retirement pension), then 
we could conclude that much more than a 
half of our pensioners is receiving pensions 
higher than actuarially neutral (similarly 
Vukorepa, 2012: 207-209). This shows 
that the Croatian pension system has a very 
strong redistributive character, which raises 
doubts about its fairness and sustainability. 
REFORM MEASURES
The Croatian pension system has been 
torn apart between sustainability and ade-
quacy issues, which are both a big challenge 
in aging societies. Since the 1990s, Croa-
tia has had negative natural increase rates 
(Akrap and Živić, 2001:632). Unfortunate-
ly, it continued in this century: in 2004 it 
was -2.1, in 2007 it was -2.4, in 2010 it was 
-2.0, in 2013 it was -2.5 (Croatian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2014). Old-age dependency ratio 
projections are comparable to the EU aver-
age: 39.11% for 2030 and 52.16% for 2060 
compared to EU -28 of 39.01% and 50.16% 
respectively, however with large differences 
between the countries, e.g. Belgium, Den-
mark, Ireland have more favourable projec-
tions (Eurostat, 2015c). Moreover, by 2060 
the effective economic old age dependency 
ratio is projected to be above 80% for Croa-
tia, also for Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania and Slovakia (European 
Commission, 2015a:65, 390). 
The terribly unfavourable Croatian pen-
sion system’s dependency ratio has been 
said to be caused by the population struc-
ture. However, the next graph shows that 
only part of the blame can be put on de-
mographic aging, and that according to it 
Croatia could still have much lower system 
dependency ratios, i.e. a much more favour-
able ratio of contributors to pensioners. 
Figure 1
Dependency Ratio Comparisons for Croatia (1961-2011) 
Source: Vukorepa, 2012: 113, based on data from Croatian Pension Insurance Institute and Croatian Bureau 
of Statistic (census data).
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The author believes that the biggest 
part of the problem lies in the poor man-
agement of the pension policy that comes 
back to us now as a boomerang. It began 
already in the 1980s (with the introduc-
tion of wage indexation of pensions and 
low standard retirement ages: 60 for men 
and 55 for women, with 5 years of early 
retirement option). It also continued after 
Croatia’s independence, when attempts 
were made to solve part of the social and 
economic problems (specifically unem-
ployment) through retirement. Constant 
changes of legislation, especially in the 
form of lowering early retirement discour-
agements, introducing many benefit ad-
ditions and exceptions from basic rules, 
made retirement attractive to many (Vu-
korepa, 2012: 113-114). Since 1998, there 
were numerous changes to the pension sys-
tem (especially regarding the first pillar, 
from 1998 to 2015 altogether 21), hence 
jeopardizing the stability of the system and 
trust in the national governments. Namely, 
this PAYGO pillar is most sensitive to po-
litical and social pressure due to its matu-
rity and unfavourable system dependency 
ratio. Pensioners plus those close to the 
retirement age makes the biggest group 
of voters. Therefore, in the atmosphere of 
dissatisfied interest groups (such as trade 
unions and pensioners’ associations) and a 
lack of constructive social dialogue, during 
pre-election or post-election times govern-
ments reneged on earlier policy directions 
and commitments, usually making costly 
and inefficient measures thereby increas-
ing future deficits. Policy choices were 
»frequently subordinated to vote and office 
–seeking objectives« (Guardiancich, 2013: 
71-80, 242). 
Almost all Croatian governments enact-
ed changes, making it more attractive for 
older workers to enter into retirement rath-
er than stay employed or search for a job 
(which is especially sensitive in the context 
of economic crisis and increased unemploy-
ment). From 2009, unemployment started 
increasing in Croatia from 9.2% reaching 
17.3% in 2014, when EU28 average was 
only 10.2% (Eurostat, 2015d). The labour 
market suffered from the economic crisis in 
addition to constant legislation changes, so 
it was not prepared to keep older workers. 
The problem has been aggravated by rigid 
labour law legislation specifying certain 
age as a reason for employment termina-
tion (especially in the public sector, see the 
next section). The statistical data reflect 
these problems. There is a low employment 
rate: in 2014, only 59.2% compared to 
EU28 average of 69.2% (Eurostat, 2015a). 
More specifically, for older workers aged 
55-64 employment rates have been much 
lower: in 2002 it was 24.8%, followed by 
an increasing trend only until 2009, when it 
reached 39.4%. During the crisis, the trend 
reversed. The employment rate of older 
workers dropped to only 36.3% in 2014, 
compared to EU28 average of 51.8%, 
while being much higher in some EU coun-
tries such as Denmark, Germany, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Sweden, Iceland, 
Norway (Eurostat, 2015b).
In addition, other features of the Cro-
atian economy have not been commenda-
ble. There is a general government deficit 
(in 2012 was -5.6% of GDP, in 2013 was 
-5.2% and in 2014 was -5.7% of GDP) and 
high gross public debt (in 2011 was 63.7% 
of GDP, in 2012 was 69.2%, in 2013 was 
80.6% and in 2014 was 85%), (Croatian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Forecasts un-
til 2016 are not bright. Croatia is under 
Excessive Deficit Procedure, and in Mar-
ch 2014, the Commission concluded also 
that Croatia was experiencing excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances in need of spe-
cific monitoring and strong policy action; 
the Excessive Imbalance Procedure was 
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not activated yet (European Commission, 
2015b, 2015c, 2015d). 
In the context of these aging and econo-
mic problems, in the next three sections I 
will highlight main reform trends in Croa-
tia, with some critical review observations. 
The focus will be on the 2013-2015 reform 
regarding mandatory parts, however with 
some inevitable reminders on past reform 
solutions. I will start with sustainability 
reform measures and countermeasures, be-
cause if that is impaired, then I am of the 
opinion that in the end the benefit adequacy 
is endangered as well. 
Measures aimed at improving pension 
system’s sustainability 
With a view of improving pension 
system’s sustainability, several measures 
have been introduced: 1) pension cuts for 
privileged pension groups and their diffe-
rent indexation, 2) changes in disability 
pensions, 3) pension increments for wor-
king longer, 4) retirement age increases.
For most of the »privileged« pension 
groups, pensions have been reduced by 
10% twice (from July 2010 and from Ja-
nuary 2014).21 Further, new Pension Insu-
rance Act (in force since 1 January 2014) 
prescribes different indexation rules than 
for the “earned” first pillar pensions. The-
se pensions in their privileged part will be 
adjusted by the Government decision, but 
only if the real growth of the GDP in each 
of the three previous consecutive quarters 
is at least 2.0% compared to the same quar-
ter of the previous calendar year and if state 
budget deficit is under 3%.22 
With the aim of reducing the costs for 
disability pensions, changes were in-
troduced through several amendments. 
During 2013 ad hoc control examination 
system was introduced23 that reduced the 
total number of disability pensioners (Na-
tional Social Report, 2014: 26). In additi-
on, recertification of disability pensions is 
prescribed to be automatically done every 
3 years. In 2014 the new unified system 
for obtaining disability pensions was esta-
blished as to reduce fraud24 and vocational 
rehabilitation system was improved. Disa-
bility definition, linked to the remaining 
work capacity, has been changed so that 
if a person is not able to work full time after 
»vocational rehabilitation« or at least 70% 
on adjusted job, he/she will qualify for to-
tal disability pension.25 This in my opinion 
could increase the number of total disa-
bility pensions (which are higher in the 
amount then partial disability pensions and 
such pensioners are put out of the labour 
marker). The validity of this conclusion is 
also suggested by the increase in the num-
ber of new entrants: in 2013 there were 
2,706 new disability pensioners and in 
2014 their number increased to 3,475 (Cro-
atian Pension Insurance Institute, 2013, 
2014: 37). Apart from total disability pensi-
on and partial disability pension (that both 
existed before under different names)26, the 
third form of disability pension was intro-
duced, i.e. temporary disability pension. 
 21  The Act on the Reduction of Certain Pensions Acquired in Accordance with Special Regulations on Pension 
Insurance, NN 71/10, 130/11, 157/13.
22  Pension Insurance Act of 2013, NN 157/2013, 151/2014, 33/2015, Art. 94, para. 2.
23  Government Regulation Amending Pension Insurance Act of 1998, NN 122/13. 
24  The Act on the Single Expertise Body of 2014 (NN 85/2014) was adopted with the intention to help limit the 
inflow of disability pensioners and reduce fraud by unifying disability assessments.
25  Pension Insurance Act of 2013, NN 157/2013, 151/2014, 33/2015, Arts. 39-60, 125-127.
26  Total disability pension (before: »disability pension due to general incapacity to work«) is allowed when 
there is permanent and full loss of working capacity. Partial disability pension (before: »disability pension due 
to professional incapacity to work«) is when there is »partial loss of working capacity«; this is according to new 
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Entitled are persons with reduced working 
capacity who even after having completed 
the professional rehabilitation remained 
unemployed for at least 5 years, provided 
that their unemployment lasted until the 
age of 58.
Very problematic is the provision pres-
cribing the conversion of total disability 
pensions (in the same amount without 
recalculation) to old-age pensions upon 
reaching the statutory old-age (applicable 
from 1 January 2015).27 This measure en-
compasses only pensioners from the regu-
lar system, and not privileged categories. 
Nevertheless, it creates a totally wrong 
statistical picture, since old age pensions 
are calculated on the actual years of ser-
vice (contributions paid) while disability 
pensions are calculated on the years of 
service plus »additional period«, that is a 
fictive period (not covered with contribu-
tions) accredited with the purpose of incre-
asing the disability benefits.28 Thus those 
pensioners are receiving implicit pension 
subsidy. During 2015 there were 86,558 
of those conversions (Croatian Pension In-
surance Institute, Statistical Information, 
1/2015:11).
Regarding retirement age, back in 
1922 in line with Bismarckian roots it was 
set very high for that time: at 70 for both 
men and women (later in 1933 reduced 
for women to 65). Later on, from 1942 to 
1980-ties there was a constant tendency 
to lower the retirement age (Vukorepa, 
2012: 126). The trend reversed when Cro-
atia gained independence and was faced 
with serious sustainability problems. Since 
1998, retirement age increases have been 
enacted on three occasions, but with very 
long transitional periods. First, the Pension 
insurance Act of 1998 increased statutory 
old-age and early retirement age by 5 ye-
ars during 10 years transitional period (6 
months increase per each calendar year). 
Hence, for women from 50 to 55 for early 
retirement and from 55 to 60 for old age 
pension, while for men from 55 to 60 for 
early retirement and from 60 to 65 for old 
age pension.29 Furthermore, from 2011 to 
2029 there is another transitional period in 
force only for women. The statutory retire-
ment age, the early retirement age and the 
qualifying period are being gradually incre-
ased and are set to be fully harmonised with 
those for men by 2030 (i.e. 65 for old age 
pension plus 15 qualifying years, 60 for 
early retirement plus 35 qualifying years).30 
The 2013 Pension Insurance Act enacted 
the third increase in pensionable age, for 
both men and women. It prescribes gradu-
al transition period: 3 months increase per 
calendar year from 2031 to 2037. Hence, 
retirement age will be increased from 65 to 
67 and the early retirement age from 60 to 
62, with the full effect only as of 2038.31 In 
view of the population aging projections, 
increases in life-expectancy and erosion of 
 
definition when a person has reduced working capacity, which due to health conditions, age, education and abilities 
is not likely to be improved by »professional rehabilitation« (type of vocational retraining) as for the person to be 
able to work full-time in a different job; however the person should be assessed to be able to work for at least 70% 
of full time working hours at adapted job that requires the same or similar level of education and corresponds to the 
previous job.
27  Government Regulation amending Pension Insurance Act of 2013, NN 151/2014, Art. 15 amending Art. 58 
(later enacted, NN 33/2015).
28  Pension Insurance Act of 2013, NN 157/2013, 151/2014, 33/2015, Arts. 32 and 86. para.3.
29  Pension Insurance Act of 1998, NN 102/1998, Arts. 30, 31, 179, 182. 
30  2010 Amendment to the Pension Insurance Act of 1998, NN 121/2010, Arts. 8, 9, 26 and 27 relating to Arts. 
30 and 31 of the Pension Insurance Act.
31  Pension Insurance Act of 2013, NN 157/2013, 151/2014, 33/2015, Arts. 33 and 34.
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pension system’s support ratio (Vukorepa, 
2012: 95-127), I doubt that such a slow and 
small increase is sustainability effective. 
However, one should be aware of the fact 
that changes in pensionable age are very 
contentious and thus politically sensitive. 
Therefore, it is unfortunate that so far Cro-
atian Government missed the opportunity 
to seriously consider putting this part of the 
pension system on »auto-pilot« (Bosworth 
and Weaver, 2011, OECD, 2012:65) by 
linking the pensionable age to the evoluti-
ons in life-expectancy. In this way political 
opposition to the introduction of changes 
would be less relevant, while at the same 
time governments would have the oppor-
tunity to suspend the application of the 
automatic mechanism if indispensable and 
affordable.
Pension increment for working lon-
ger has been introduced in 2011 for persons 
who continue working after the statutory 
retirement age; it amounts to 0.15% per 
each month of later retirement, but is awar-
ded for maximum 5 years, hence the total 
increment is limited to 9%. This measure 
is supposed to stimulate later retirement, 
but its effectiveness and actuarial fairness 
is doubtful, especially when compared to 
early retirement decrements, as explained 
below. 
Countermeasures to sustainability 
measures
I am of the opinion that potential positi-
ve effect on pension system’s sustainability 
of »retirement increase« and »pension 
increment for working longer« is jeopar-
dized by several other reform measures 
(some introduced with a view of improving 
pension adequacy and social sensitivity), 
as well as by employment and tax legi-
slation. These countermeasures are: 1) de-
crease in early retirement decrements, 2) 
two new types of early retirements without 
decrement, 3) work upon retirement with 
full pension in payment, 4) employment 
legislation linking employment terminati-
on to 65, and 5) continued unequal tax tre-
atment of pensions and other employment 
incomes. I argue that all these countermea-
sures will most likely result in an increase 
of the number of pensioners above the level 
that could be normally expected taking into 
account demographic trends only.32
Reduction of benefits for early retire-
ment exists from 1999 when Pension Insu-
rance Act of 1998 came into force. Until the 
end of 2007, the early retirement decrement 
was 0.34% per month (hence 4.08% per 
year of early retirement, 20.40% for maxi-
mum 5 years early retirement). This amou-
nt was considered to be close to actuarially 
neutral correction of the pension benefit 
due to longer period of payments (World 
Bank, 2011: 25). Nevertheless, during elec-
tion year 2007 it has been decreased to only 
0.15% per month (thus to 1.8% per year; 
9% for 5 years).33 Such decreased level 
was applicable from 2008 to 2010. Since 
2011 the maximum reduction for early re-
tirement depends not only on the months 
of early retirement, but also on the years of 
insurance (mainly years of contributions),34 
which discriminates contributors who have 
served fewer years. From 2011 to 2013 it 
was from min. 9% to max. 20.4% for 5 ye-
ars early retirement. The new Pension insu-
 
32  This author’s opinion is also corroborated partially by the Government Guidelines for Economic and Fiscal 
Policy 2015 -2017. For 2015, pension expenditures are projected in the amount of HRK 36.5 billion, which is 85 
million more than in 2014, as a result of an increase in the number of pension beneficiaries (Croatian Government, 
2014a: 15). 
33  2007 Amendments to Pension Insurance Act of 1998, NN 79/07, Art. 2 (changing Art. 78).
34  2010 Amendment to the Pension Insurance Act of 1998, NN 121/2010, Art. 13 (changing Art. 78). 
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rance Act of 2013 further reduced the early 
retirement decrement for persons with long 
years of contributions so that since January 
2014 it ranges from 6% (for persons with 
40 years of insurance) to 20.4% (for per-
sons with 35 or less years of insurance). All 
these changes have influenced significantly 
the rise in the take-up of early pensions 
(visible below in Figure 2). Such differen-
tiation of early retirement decrements ba-
sed on years of contributions is in my opi-
nion inappropriate for two reasons. First, 
the contingence within pension systems 
is neither work nor years of contribution 
(they are taken into account when calcu-
lating benefit). Contingence is old-age and 
there-to presumed lower work capacity. Se-
cond, the basic purpose of early retirement 
decrement is actuarial reduction of benefits 
due to longer periods of benefit collection 
than in the case of regular old-age retire-
ment (Munnell and Sass, 2012). Therefore, 
in my opinion years of contributions sho-
uld not be relevant, but instead months and 
years of early retirement in relation to life 
expectancy as to avoid additional costs to 
the PAYGO first pillar scheme. 
In relation to these arguments, I also find 
problematic two new types of early retire-
ment pensions without decrement that the 
legislator introduced since 2014.35 The first 
is »early retirement pension due to long-
time insurance« for persons after reaching 
60 years of age and 41 qualifying years. 
It was later during the year renamed into 
»old-age pension for long-insured«.36 The 
amount of benefit for this type of pension is 
determined without application of early re-
tirement decrement, although these groups 
will use pension rights longer than regular 
old age pensioners will. Moreover, they 
are entitled to rewarding if working longer 
than 60 (0.15% for each month, up to max. 
9%). The second is »early retirement pen-
sion due to bankruptcy«, that was intro-
duced for persons fulfilling early retirement 
conditions and whose insurance status was 
terminated due to employer’s bankruptcy, 
provided they have been unemployed for 
at least 2 years continuously prior to reti-
rement. Many persons have used the first 
option to retire early (4.580 persons during 
2014), while considerably less have used 
the second form of this exceptional early 
retirement (only 11). Regarding the number 
of all types of new early retirement benefi-
ciaries,  again the rising trend is evident: 
12,015 persons in 2009, 21,140 in 2010, 
13,384 in 2011, 13,553 in 2012, 15,684 in 
2013, 18,023 in 2014 (Croatian Pension In-
surance Institute, see also Figure 2 below). 
I argue this is due to these legislative chan-
ges. 
Work upon retirement has been parti-
ally allowed since 2014, as another adequ-
acy measure permitting retirees to increase 
their income. Namely, the payment of old-
age pension is not any more suspended if 
beneficiaries continue to work part-time 
(maximum 20 hours per week) and only 
as employees (this measure does not co-
ver self-employment).37 Old age pension 
to such persons is paid in full, without any 
reduction, while partial disability pension 
is payable during employment in a reduced 
amount.38 I cannot but wonder at the ratio-
nale behind such a solution. I think it raises 
at least two concerns. The first is the issue 
of discrimination of pensioners continuing 
 35  Pension Insurance Act of 2013, NN 157/2013, Arts. 35 and 36.
36  2014 Government Regulation Amending Pension Insurance Act of 2013, NN 151/2014, Art. 6 changing Art. 
35 (later this Government Regulation was enacted, NN 33/2015).
37  Pension Insurance Act, NN 157/2013, 151/2014, 33/2015, Art. 99. 
38  Ibidem, Art. 87 (In the amount of 67% if partial disability is caused by accident at work or occupational 
decease, and in the amount of 50% due to other accidents or illnesses).
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to work based on disability. The second 
is that the effectiveness of retirement age 
increases, because this measure together 
with some other (e.g. early retirement for 
long-insured without decrement) discou-
rages people to stay in full employment. 
It seems that the Government is repeating 
the mistakes from the 1990s when unem-
ployment problem was solved through pen-
sion system, thus passing on the problem to 
younger and /or unborn generations. 
Employment legislation still linking 
employment termination to the age of 
65 is also preventing older people from 
actually working longer. Namely, the new 
Labour Act (NN 93/2014, Art 112) still 
prescribes, as did the old legislation from 
1994 and 2009, that the employment con-
tract shall be terminated when the worker 
reaches the age of 65 and 15 years of re-
tirement qualifying years, unless otherwi-
se agreed between the employer and the 
worker. Hence, the worker cannot stay 
employed unless the employer agrees. 
Furthermore, there is legislation discou-
raging employers from doing so. Manda-
tory Health Insurance Act (NN 80/2013, 
137/2013, Art. 50) prohibits coverage of 
salary compensation by health insurance 
when workers aged 65 or older are on sick 
leave; the cost should be entirely covered 
solely by the employer. Specifically strict 
legislation regarding termination of em-
ployment is present in the public sector 
where ex lege termination of employment 
is connected to the age 65, allowing only 
in very rare and exceptional circumstances 
for prolongations (e.g. civil servants, pu-
blic health service sector, primary and se-
condary schools, universities and scientific 
institutes etc.).39 Thus, legislative changes 
are necessary also in employment legisla-
tion if consistent policy towards retirement 
age increases is to be conducted. 
Further problem in my opinion lies in 
the continued unequal tax treatment of 
wages and pensions. It is a measure direc-
ted towards pension adequacy, however I 
think with adverse effect discouraging pe-
ople from working longer. Namely, there 
is a higher non-taxable portion of income 
(so called »basic personal allowance«) for 
pensioners than for wage earners and the 
self-employed. This difference was intro-
duced in 1995 and was very low in the be-
ginning (only HRK 50.00),40 but through 
the years was increased and now amounts to 
HRK 1,200.00.41 Recent tax changes (with 
the effect from January 2015) have increa-
sed the levels of non-taxable portion of the 
income by HRK 400.00, equally for pen-
sioners and other income earners.42 Hence, 
pensioners are now entitled to a monthly 
personal deduction in the amount of the to-
tal pension, but at the maximum of HRK 
3,800.00, while wage earners and the self-
employed enjoy basic personal allowance 
amounting to 2,600.00 HRK. This latest 
increase of the basic personal allowance 
will, according to the Government estima-
39  Civil Servants Act, NN 92/2005, 140/2005, 142/2006, 77/2007, 107/2007, 27/2008, 34/2011, 49/2011, 
150/2011, 34/2012, 38/2013, 37/2013, 1/2015, Art. 137; Health Protection Act, NN 150/2008, 155/2009, 71/2010, 
139/2010, 22/2011, 84/2011, 154/2011, 12/2012, 35/2012, 70/2012, 144/2012, 82/2013, 159/2013, 22/2014, 
154/2014, Art. 159; Act on Education in Primary and Secondary Schools, NN 87/2008, 86/2009, 92/2010, 
105/2010, 90/2011, 5/2012, 16/2012, 86/2012, 94/2013, 152/2014, Art. 112; Act on Science and Higher Education, 
NN 123/2003, 198/2003, 105/2004, 174/2004, 2/2007, 46/2007, 45/2009, 45/2009, 63/2011, 94/2013, 139/2013, 
101/2014, 60/2015, Art. 42 para. 8, and Art. 102, para 7 – 8. 
40   Amendments to the Income Tax Act of 1994, NN 95/94. Art. 31 changing Art. 34.
41   Income Tax Act of 2000, NN 127/00, 150/02, 163/03, 30/04, Art. 29; Income Tax Act of 2004, NN 177/04, 
73/08, 80/10, 114/11, 22/12, 144/12, 120/13,125/13, 148/13, 83/2014, 143/2014, Art. 36.
42  Amendments to the Income Tax Act, NN 143/14, Art. 13.
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tes, exempt around 80,000 pensioners from 
income tax payment. In addition, around 
145,000 retirees will profi t from an incre-
ase in the net pension. However, the State 
budget revenues from personal income tax 
are expected to fall on an annual basis by 
about 136 million HRK (Croatian Parlia-
ment, 2014: 4). Moreover, the amount of 
non-taxable parts of the income should be 
considered in the context of gross mini-
mum wage (for 2015 set at 3,029.55 HRK, 
NN 151/2014) that has been set below the 
maximum personal allowance for pensi-
ons. Thus in this context, the preferential 
tax treatment of income from pensions re-
presents another measure deterring people 
from working longer. 
All these elaborated countermeasures 
refl ect a confusing and inconsistent pen-
sion policy that discourages work and sti-
mulates retirement, which all responsible 
governments would want to avoid. The sta-
tistical data unfortunately prove my argu-
ment that, due to unemployment and vario-
us new legislative changes, there has been 
a rise in the number of new pension benefi -
ciaries. Exits from the unemployment regi-
stry due to various types of retirement have 
increased signifi cantly during 2014 compa-
red to previous years: in 2014 exit registry 
counted 7,019 persons aged over 60 and 
2,914 persons aged 55-59; in 2013 it coun-
ted 5,100 persons aged over 60 and 2,336 
aged 55-59 and in 2012 it counted 4,448 
persons aged over 60 and 2,109 aged 55-59 
(Croatian Employment Service). Hence, as 
visible from Figure 2, legislation is not dis-
couraging people from retirement; on the 
contrary, it may be rightfully considered 
that it contributes to the rising number of 
new benefi ciaries.
Figure 2 .
New pensioners (without privileged groups), by years and pension type
 
Source: Author based on the periodical “Statistical Information” from the Croatian Pension Insurance Insti-
tute.
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Measures aimed at pension adequacy 
Croatian pensioners are generally con-
sidered to be poor, however, it should be 
pointed out that pension amounts differ, 
depending whether the pension was acqu-
ired before 1998 or after 1999, whether 
the person falls under the regular scheme 
or among one of the 14 »privileged grou-
ps«. The data on aggregate replacement 
ratio43 also suggest  a significant drop in li-
ving standards compared to pre-retirement 
earnings: in 2013 it was 0.37 compared to 
EU-28 average of 0.55 (Eurostat, 2015e). 
This can be explained by several factors. 
First, until 2002 private pension systems 
did not exist; so most of the current pen-
sioners do not have that kind of pension 
income. Second, the fact is that PAYGO 
system’s support ratio is constantly drop-
ping and is extremely low, around 1.14, as 
shown above. Third, many pensioners have 
short periods of service (qualifying years). 
In 2004, only 13.57% of pensioners recei-
ved pensions on the basis of 40 or more 
qualifying years, while 41.96% have less 
than 30 years of service (Croatian Pension 
Insurance Institute, Statistical Informati-
on, 4/2014:28). Hence, there is a constant 
challenge of how to provide adequate level 
of pensions within the economic and social 
context of Croatian society (e.g. Nestić et 
al, 2012; Nestić and Tomić, 2012).
In addition to the measures mentioned 
in the previous section (i.e. reduction of 
early pension decrements, increases of the 
non-taxable portion of the income), several 
other measures have been introduced with 
the aim of improving the first pillar and/or 
second pillar pension’s adequacy. Those 
measures are: 1) possibility to opt-out from 
two-tier system, 2) change in the pension 
indexation formula, 3) change in the “ba-
sic pension formula”, 4) implementation of 
life-style funds within the second pillar, 5) 
reduction of management fees. 
Possibility to opt-out from two-tier 
system for optional participants (i.e. tho-
se who were between 40 and 50 years of 
age in 2002) was enacted in 2011 with a 
view to improve their pension level, which 
was lower than pensions from single-pillar 
system.44 For those who are still employed, 
a possibility to abandon the second pillar at 
the time of retirement is still allowed.45 It is 
likely that in practice the second pillar op-
tional contributors will be using this right 
if they assess that the single-tier pension 
(only from the PAYGO scheme) would be 
more favourable than the pension from the 
two-tier system. 
Before 1998, pensions were only wage 
indexed. From 1999 to 2013, pension in-
dexation was done twice per year accor-
ding to the so-called Swiss formula (50% 
wage: 50% prices). During 2010 and 2011, 
pension indexation was suspended due to 
economic reasons with a view of cutting 
pension expenditures (Vukorepa, 2012: 
43  In Eurostat methodology, it is the ratio of the median individual gross pensions of 65-74 age category relative 
to median individual gross earnings of 50-59 age category, excluding other social benefits.
44  This was due to several reasons. First, they were not entitled to pension supplement reserved only for single-
tier pensioners, hence those who were older than 50 in 2002. The amount of pension supplement depends on the 
year of retirement (since 2010 it is 27%). The second reason is that the majority of such pensioners were women 
who retired early from mostly low paid jobs and who were paying contributions for funded second pillar scheme 
for a very short time (around only 7 years). Their average retirement age was 55-57 years. As a result, the average 
amount of pension acquired from the second pillar was extremely low: HRK 107.17 (in addition to the average 
amount of pension from the first pillar of HRK 1,965.83). Records show that 97% of beneficiaries of two tier system 
opted for pension recalculation, as if they had been insured only within the single tier system (1,238 out of 1,279 of 
beneficiaries). See: Vukorepa, 2012: 140.
45  Act on Mandatory Pension Funds, NN 19/2014, Art. 104.
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136). Recently there were changes in the 
pension indexation formula that affect equ-
ally the first and second pillar pensions. Na-
mely, Pension Insurance Act of 2013 con-
tinues to apply same parameters for benefit 
indexation (i.e. increases in the consumer 
prices and average gross wages). However, 
it introduced a new complicated rotating 
formula: 1) for 1 July indexation there is 
a fixed 50:50 ratio, and 2) for 1 January 
indexation there are variable ratios, depen-
ding on trends in prices and wages (70:30, 
50:50 and 30:70), whereby always a more 
favourable ratio for pensioners. Pensions 
cannot be indexed downwards. Regarding 
indexation of »privileged« pensions, since 
2015 they have been indexed differently 
in their privileged part (by Government 
decision, but only if the real growth of the 
GDP in each of the 3 previous consecuti-
ve quarters was at least 2.0% compared to 
the same quarter of the previous calendar 
year and if state budget deficit was under 
3%).46 Thus, the new indexation formula 
will positively impact pension adequacy, 
but it is reasonable to expect that it might 
have a long-term negative impact on pensi-
on system’s deficit. 
Since 2014 there has been a change 
in the »basic pension formula« (i.e. for-
mula for pensions from the first pillar for 
persons acquiring benefits under the two-
tier system). The solidarity element (Potoč-
njak, 2000b: 11-13) was removed from the 
formula. The new formula is now based on 
the same elements as the general formula 
multiplied by the so called »basic pension 
factor«. It represents the average ratio of 
contributions paid to the first pillar sche-
me in relation to the total contribution for 
mandatory pension system (now it amounts 
to 0.75, because the first pillar contribution 
rate for two-tier participants is 15% and the 
total mandatory pension contribution’s rate 
is 20%, i.e. 5% is forwarded to individual 
savings within mandatory second DC pi-
llar).
Regarding the second pillar pensions, 
the new Mandatory Pension Funds Act of 
2014 introduced life-style funds with life-
cycle approach with a view of reduction of 
investment risk while approaching the reti-
rement age.47 The model has been imple-
mented as of August 2014. Each mandatory 
pension fund (currently there are 4) has to 
have 3 sub-funds of different investment 
risk exposure (A - aggressive, B - balanced, 
C - conservative). Participation in the sub-
funds automatically changes with age. Sub-
fund A is for fund members that have 10 or 
more years until the statutory old age, B is 
for those who have 5 or more years, and 
C is for those who have less than 5 years 
until the statutory old-age. However, fund 
members are allowed to make a more con-
servative choice. If no choice is made, the 
B sub-fund is a default fund until 5 years 
before the statutory old age. The predomi-
nant majority of second pillar participants 
stayed within B funds (around 97% at the 
end of 2014, data from Croatian Financi-
al Services Supervisory Agency). Type 
B funds are the »successor« of  previous 
single-funds run by four different pension 
fund companies. Kovačević and Latko-
vić (2015) have shown that with the A-B-
C savings scheme, the fund members are 
better off than in the old single fund model, 
even in the event of a market shock at the 
time of retirement (so called timing-risk). 
However, possible further improvements 
should be considered, especially regar-
ding investment options in sub-fund C. It 
has been demonstrated that the expected 
risk for fund C as compared to that of fund 
B is not proportionally smaller, given the 
46  Pension Insurance Act, NN 157/2013, 151/2014, 33/2015, Arts. 88 and 94. 
47  Act on Mandatory Pension Funds, NN 19/2014, Art. 78-96, 124-136.
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reduction in the exposure to equity, which 
can be explained primarily by the lack of 
investment diversification (Kovačević and 
Latković, 2015: 52-54). In relation to these 
considerations, I find it unfortunate that law 
proponents did not consider and compare 
all the other options for lifecycle portfolio 
management proposed by scholars before 
drafting law, e.g. target-date funds (Potoč-
njak and Vukorepa, 2012). 
It is commendable that there has been a 
reduction in the management fee for se-
cond pillar pension funds. Management fee 
is one of several fees charged (together with 
fee on contributions, custodian fee, exit fee 
and remittance fee). Until the end of 2013 
the statutory maximum management fee 
was 1.2%. However, the Croatian Financi-
al Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA) 
decided on its actual level on a yearly basis. 
Over the years, it was gradually decreased: 
from 2003 to 2006 it was 1.2%, in 2007 it 
was 0.95%, in 2008 it was 0.85%, in 2009 
it was 0.8%, in 2010 it was 0.75%, in 2011 
it was 0.65%, in 2012 and 2013 it was set 
at 0.45% (Vukorepa, 2012: 332-347). Since 
2014, the management fee has been statu-
torily set at 0.45% for years  2013, 2014 
and 2015 and for each following year it will 
be reduced by 7%, until it finally reaches 
0.3% ( i.e. in 2020).48 This reduction in the 
management fee is expected to have some 
positive effects on accumulation on savings 
within the second pillar. 
CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Unfortunately, in societies faced with 
economic turmoil, low employment rates 
and high unemployment, demographic pro-
blems (increases in life expectancy, falling 
birth rates and emigration) and consequ-
ently very high pension system’s depen-
dency ratios and under-funding, it is very 
difficult to meet sustainability and adequ-
acy objectives without jeopardizing one by 
making measures to meet the other. Never-
theless, consistency in approach, long-term 
planning and fine-tuning is needed. 
Arguments and statistical data shown 
in this paper reveal many inconsistencies 
and a lack of foresight in the legislator’s 
approach. Recent changes have been desi-
gned to induce retirement instead of pro-
moting work and later retirement, which 
is also evident in the rising number of 
old-age and early retirement beneficiaries. 
The potential positive effect of some me-
asures has been endangered by their mild-
ness, as well as by other countermeasures 
within and outside the pension system. 
Examples are numerous: 1) low and slow 
increases in retirement age simultaneous 
with the introduction of new pathways to 
early exits from the labour market, 2) actu-
arially unfair early retirement decrements 
and pension increments for working lon-
ger, 3) employment legislation still linking 
employment termination to the age of 65, 
4) work upon retirement with full pension 
in payment, 5) continued unequal tax tre-
atment of pensions and other incomes from 
employment, and 6) fragmentation of pen-
sion system through numerous privileged 
groups which squeezes out financial resour-
ces for standard pensions and gives rise to 
unequal treatment. Regarding tighter disa-
bility pension assessments and controls, the 
effect on expenditures will depend on how 
the measures will be implemented, especi-
ally taking into account the new definitions 
of partial and total disability. Most recent 
data from 2014 unfortunately show increa-
ses in the number of new disability pensio-
ners, thus not providing much hope.   
48  Act on Mandatory Pension Funds, NN 19/2014, Art. 63. 
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Regarding benefit adequacy, during 
2014 several adequacy measures were 
enacted, e.g. a new complex indexation 
pattern; new formula for basic pensions 
(first pillar pensions for two-tier parti-
cipants); life-style funds with life-cycle 
approach and reduction of management 
fees in the second pillar. The new indexati-
on pattern with rotating and variable ratios 
is more generous than the previous one. In 
the long-run it will probably cost more and 
will distribute a larger share of growth to 
pensioners. Adjustment of basic pension 
proportional to the share of first pillar con-
tribution in total contributions will proba-
bly reduce a part of discrepancy between 
single-tier pensioners and two-tier pensio-
ners, however increasing costs in the long 
term.  Therefore, if new adequacy measures 
would be necessary in the future, then I am 
of the opinion that they should be focused 
only towards the »really poor«, hence me-
ans tested. For example, since Croatian mi-
nimum pension (benefit above the earned 
pension,) is currently not means tested, it 
could be divided into »earned« pension and 
»social pension part« that should be means 
tested. 
New sustainability-oriented changes 
will be inevitable in the future. This is 
also suggested by the EU that recommen-
ds acceleration of the retirement increases, 
discouragement of  early retirement by rai-
sing penalties for early exits, improvement 
of the adequacy and efficiency of pension 
spending by tightening the definition of ar-
duous and hazardous professions (Council 
Recommendation of 8 July 2014, 2014/C 
247/10, European Commission, 2015d). 
The government does not plan any new 
reform programmes for the period 2015-
2017, only changes to the special system 
of insurance periods counted with exten-
ded duration, now in place mainly for ha-
zardous and arduous occupations, but also 
for persons with disability such as blind 
persons, persons with multiple sclerosis 
etc. (Croatian Government, 2014b: 66). 
Since this preferential system has been in 
place for a very long time, the reform will 
be most probably much disputed among 
interest groups and social partners. There-
fore, I doubt that during the election period 
2015/2016 the Government will be willing 
to put forward any significant changes.  Ne-
vertheless, future governments will have to 
deal with these and many other problems 
within the pension system (some caused 
by recent 2013-2015 parametric reform). 
Here are some suggestions. Firstly, regar-
ding future changes to increases in the re-
tirement age and benefit adjustments, since 
these measures are always highly policy 
sensitive, putting a system on auto-pilot 
should be considered (in line with chan-
ges in life-expectancy and some other de-
mographic and economic factors, but also 
with revision checks at regular intervals). 
Secondly, later retirement increment could 
be increased (also for more than 5 years) 
as to be actuarially fair and offering more 
incentive to work. Thirdly, early retirement 
decrement should be increased again as to 
be actuarially neutral. Shortening of the 
five year period for early retirement could 
be considered. The problem of hazardous 
occupations and especially arduous jobs 
(e.g. ballet dancers, opera singers, pilots 
and flying teachers) should be solved as to 
stimulate their longer stay at work in other 
jobs and not by putting them into early pen-
sion.
However, it is indispensable that all the-
se measures are also complemented with 
other strategies outside pension policy as 
to enable older people to be fit and able to 
work longer, hence postpone their retire-
ment. Therefore, several other reforms are 
necessary. Firstly, we need flexible labour 
markets that will be willing to employ ol-
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der workers. Therefore, educational policy, 
tax legislation and employment legislation 
should be adapted. Labour legislation and 
health insurance provisions that currently 
hamper employment above 65 (especially 
in public administration, education and 
health sector) should be changed. Being 
a problem in itself, such legislation addi-
tionally raises concerns about increases in 
redistribution between the economically 
active elderly in the private sector and 
the “unproductive” elderly in the public 
sector. Secondly, increases in the retire-
ment age might lead to other pathways for 
early exits from the labour market, such as 
unemployment, long-term sickness and di-
sability benefits, that also influence public 
expenditures. Therefore, it seems to me 
that “activation logic” in sickness policies 
(Voissen and Gestel, 2015), aimed at full 
recovery (if possible) and facilitating acce-
ss to employment thereby inhibiting exits 
from labour market becomes very impor-
tant. Thirdly, we need strong and effective 
health oriented policies and thereto connec-
ted specific measures (e.g. more preventi-
ve than curative health system; promotion 
of healthy life styles, exercise therapy and 
nourishing habits; higher taxes on various 
types of “junk food” and lower taxes on 
healthy bio, non-GMO and locally grown 
food etc.). Hence, we need consistent poli-
cies and holistic approaches that will work 
towards sound pension systems and effecti-
ve increases in the labour market participa-
tion of elderly. 
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Sažetak 
IZGUBLJENA IZMEĐU ODRŽIVOSTI I PRIMJERENOSTI: 
KRITIČKA ANALIZA PARAMETARSKE REFORME HRVATSKOG 
MIROVINSKOG SUSTAVA 
Ivana Vukorepa
Pravni fakultet, Sveučilište u Zagreb
Zagreb, Hrvatska
Danas, kada smo suočeni sa starenjem stanovništva, promjenama u strukturi obiteljskih 
zajednica, nepovoljnostima na tržištu rada, nestandardnim i novim oblicima rada, sivom 
ekonomijom, financijskom i gospodarskom krizom, mnogi su zabrinuti oko dva važna pi-
tanja: financijske održivost mirovinskih sustava i primjerene razine mirovina (kratkoročno 
i dugoročno). Stoga su gotovo sve zemlje u svijetu poduzele neke reforme. Situacija je 
dodatno otežana u zemljama s visokim proračunskim deficitom i deficitima u mirovinskom 
sustavu, nepovoljnim stopama ovisnosti, dugotrajno negativnim stopama prirodnog prira-
sta, niskom zaposlenosti i visokom nezaposlenosti. Nažalost, Hrvatska je suočena sa svim 
tim problemima. Stoga je hrvatski mirovinski sustav prošao kroz brojne reforme: jednu 
sustavnu reformu (provedena od 1998. do 2002. što je rezultiralo uspostavom trodijelnog 
sustava) te nekoliko parametarskih reformi, od kojih se posljednja odnosila na sva tri stupa 
(od 2013. do 2015.). Cilj rada je provesti kritičku pravnu analizu ove posljednje parame-
tarske reforme u svjetlu održivosti mirovinskog sustava i primjerenosti razine mirovina, 
uz neizbježna podsjećanja na neka prethodna reformska rješenja. Autor otkriva mnoge 
nedosljednosti zakonodavca te nedostatke i propuste u promišljanju reformskih mjera, koji 
dugoročno mogu ugroziti i financijsku održivost i primjerenost razine mirovina. Štoviše, 
učestale zakonske promjene posljednjih godina, kao i postojanje brojnih skupina povlašte-
nih umirovljenika narušavaju predvidivost, stabilnost, učinkovitost i pravičnost sustava te 
povjerenje u vladajuće elite. Nadalje, autor upozorava da se samo dio postojećih problema 
može riješiti promjenama u samom mirovinskom sustavu (kroz opreznije i sveobuhvatnije 
promišljene reforme). Te promjene moraju biti dopunjene drugim komplementarnim stra-
tegijama i mjerama (npr. u okviru zdravstvenog sustava, poreznog sustava, tržišta rada i 
radnog zakonodavstva).
Ključne riječi: Hrvatska, mirovine, mirovinska reforma, održivost, primjerenost. 
